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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ~ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARENCE E. BRIDGE, \ 
Defendant and Appellant.} 
Case No. 
8314 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Clarence E. Bridge, was, by a jury, found 
guilty of robbery. The verdict returned on October 28th, 
1954, and sentence five years to life, imposed on November 
13th, 1954. 
The fact that a robbery took place at the Claud Ann 
Apartment at 23 North 1st West in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at approximately 11 p. m. on the night of April 19th, 1954, 
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was established by the testimony of the victim, Mrs. Edna 
Brennan, age seventy, (R. 21-26) and by the testimony of 
D. J. McDonough, an eye witness to the crime (R. 26-28). 
Neither of these witnesses placed the appellant at the scene 
of the crime. However, the witness, Brennan, had a ten 
year acquaintanceship with the appellant and testified that 
he, appellant, knew where the safe was in her residence and 
knew that she had a brown purse (R. 25). This witness 
testified further that a cash box was taken from the safe; 
(R. 23) that currency and checks were taken from pigeon 
holes in the safe (R. 23). The witness, McDonough, testi-
fied that Milton B. Head, an accomplice, asked the victim, 
"where her brown purse was?" (R. 27). 
The accomplice, Milton B. Head, testified that he had 
been told about the brown purse; (R. 43) that appellant, 
Bridge, told him it was supposed to contain the money in-
side the safe (R. 43). 
Salt Lake Police Officer Don B. Pearson testified that 
he investigated the robbery; (R. 29) that he took a state-
ment from appellant; (R. 29) that he informed appellant 
of his rights in connection with the making of such state-
ment; (R. 30) that he obtained the statement without threat 
or force; (R. 30) that he promised appellant no reward; 
(R. 30) that appellant signed the statement (R. 31). Coun-
sel for appellant objected to the admission of this state-
ment (confession) in evidence "on constitutional grounds 
on which I will lay a foundation at a later time" (R. 31). 
The objection was overruled. This police officer further 
testified that the appellant told him that the cash box taken 
from the Claud Ann Apartment, from the victim, was in 
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a culvert on 6th South and 2nd West (R. 32). On cross-
examination Officer Pearson said that appellant had made 
requests for an attorney; (R. 33, 35, 36) that appellant 
was told to make his request to the jailer (R. 33). 
Police Officer Dean Anderson, called as a witness for 
the State, testified that he recovered the cash box under 
the culvert just east of 2nd West on 6th South, at 260 West 
6th South (R. 39). 
Appellant moved for dismissal of the cause; ( R. 55) 
for judgment non obstante verdicto (R. 58). Both motions 
were denied. 
The court did not instruct the jury that the testimony 
of an accomplice need be corroborated by other evidence be-
fore a conviction can be had on such testimony standing 
alone. (Sec. 77-31-8, U. C. A. 1953.) The appellant joined 
with the State in taking no exception to the court's instruc-
tions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF APPEL-
LANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VIOLATIVE 
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, NOR TITLE 
77, CHAPTER 15, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CONVICTED 
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED 
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE AND THE 
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFI-
CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF APPEL-
LANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VIOLATIVE 
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, NOR TITLE 
77, CHAPTER 15, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
There is nothing in the record in this cause to indicate 
that the confession of the defendant was not voluntarily 
given. There is nothing in the record that said confession 
was obtained by force, fear, coercion or promise of im-
munity or benefit. The record does not show that there 
was any objection to the admission in evidence of the con-
fession except "on constitutional grounds." This objection 
was properly overruled. The record clearly shows, as does 
the confession itself, that appellant was fully advised as 
to his rights before making the statement. 
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Appellant here complains of a violation of due process 
of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 12, of 
the Constitution of Utah; the latter as augmented by the 
Utah Code of Civil Procedure, Section 77-15-1, 1953. Spe-
cifically, in that appellant was denied counsel. 
The requirement of the 14th Amendment is for a fair 
trial. Massey v. Moore, Warden (1954), Advance Reports 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Lawyers' Edi-
tion, Vol. 99, No. 3, page 117; citing Betts v. Brady, 316 
U.S. 455, 462, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 1601, 62 S. Ct. 1252. 
As to the statutory and constitutional provisions of 
the State of Utah, above set forth and relied upon by ap-
pellant, this Court has considered and resolved the question 
as to the right to counsel before a defendant may be ques-
tioned by police officers. The Court said: 
And, 
"\Ve have found no case which holds that a 
confession is not admissible in evidence merely be-
cause the defendant was immature and without the 
advise of counsel, friends or relatives [as appellant 
here argues] when it was made and Mares v. Hill, 
supra, considered this very problem and held that 
those facts did not make the confession inadmissible 
in evidence." (Comment added.) 
"* * * the mere fact that a confession is made 
while the accused is in the custody of the police offi-
cers does not render it inadmissible." 
State v. Braasch, ... Utah ... , 229 P. 2d 289. 
Appellant does not contend that the confession was not 
voluntarily given and claims no error in this respect. 
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT CONVICTED 
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED 
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE AND THE 
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFI-
CIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY. 
Appellant says: 
"It is the contention of defendant that Section 
77-31-18, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which is the gen-
eral statute as to testimony of accomplices and the 
need for corroboration of such testimony in order 
to support a conviction is applicable in the instant 
case." 
The State joins in this contention. The State also concedes 
that the witnesses, Brennan, McDonough, Officer Anderson 
and Officer Pearson, were not able to independently place 
the appellant at the scene of the crime. However, the tes-
timony of the accomplice, Head, shows that appellant drove 
the car to the Claud Ann Apartments, where the offense 
was consummated, and drove the car away when the per-
petrators of the crime fled. The part played by appellant 
in the robbery was that of driver of the get-away car. This 
witness also testified that he had knowledge of a brown 
purse which was supposed to contain the money and that 
he received this information from the appellant (R. 43). 
This testimony was corroborated by that of the witness, 
McDonough, who said that he heard this accomplice ask 
the victim "where her brown purse was." The question of 
what amounts to sufficient corroboration has been many 
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times before this Court. In the case of State v. Erwin, 101 
Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285, this Court held: 
"This Court has held this corroboration need 
not go to all the material facts testified to by the 
accomplice (State v. Stewart, 57 Ut. 224, 193 P. 
855) ; that the corroborative evidence need not be 
sufficient in itself to support a conviction; it may 
be slight and entitled to little consideration. People 
v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State v. Spender, 15 Utah 149, 
49 p. 302. * * * 
"On the other hand, the corroborating evidence 
must implicate the defendant in the offense and be 
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his 
innocence, and must do more than cast a grave sus-
picion on him, and all of this must be without the 
aid of the testimony of the accomplice. State v. Lay, 
38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986; State v. Butterfield, 70 
Utah 529, 261 P. 804; State v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 
140 P. 768; State v. Kimball, 45 Utah 443, 146 P. 
313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 193, 143 P. 588; State 
v. Bridwell, 48 Utah 97, 158 P. 710; State v. Baum, 
47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518; State v. Frisby, 49 Utah 227, 
162 P. 616; State v. Elmer, 49 Utah 6, 161 P. 167; 
State v. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d 51. 
"The corroborative evidence of an accomplice, 
unlike proof of corpus delicti, may consist in the ad-
missions of the accused. * * *" 
See Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 11th Edition, Volume 
2, Section 752, 753, 7 48, 7 46 and 754, pages 1257 to 1273 
inclusive. See also 25 A. L. R. 886; 87 A. L. R. 767; State v. 
Wade, 66 Utah 276, 241 P. 838; State v. Laris, 78 Utah 
183, 2 P. 2d 243; State v. Caroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203; 
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972; People v. Derenzo, 
46 Cal. App. 2d 411, 115 P. 2d 858; and People v. Negra, 
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208 Cal. 64, 280 P. 354. In the recent case of State v. Vigil, 
. . . Utah ... , 260 P. 2d 539, the Court stated the rule 
thusly: 
"* * * the corroborating evidence must connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense, 
State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986; and be con-
sistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his inno-
cence, State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P. 804. 
The corroborating evidence must do more than cast 
a grave suspicion on the defendant and it must do 
all of these things without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice." 
In the case at bar, the corroborating evidence connects 
the appellant with the con1mission of the offense, is con-
sistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence 
and casts upon him more than a grave suspicion. 
We are a ware of tl;J.e fact that the court did not instruct 
the jury that an accomplice's testimony must be corrobo-
rated. This was not prejudicial error. In State v. Hall, 112 
Utah 272, 186 P. 2d 970, in an unanimous opinion, Mr. 
Justice Wolfe, concurring specially and directly on this 
issue, the Court said : 
"Now as to the failure of the court to instruct 
on the law applicable to the testimony of an accom-
plice. Our Code, section 105-32-18, U. C. A. 1943, 
prohibits the finding of an accused guilty upon the 
evidence of an accomplice unless that evidence is 
corroborated. It reads: 
'A conviction shall not be had on the testi-
mony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated 
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by other evidence, which in itself and without 
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends 
to connect the defendant with the commission 
of the offense ; and the corroboration shall not 
be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission 
of the offense or the circumstances thereof.' 
* * * Counsel * * * submitted no requests 
for instructions nor did he take any exceptions to 
any instructions given by the lower court, nor to 
the court's refusal or failure to give any particular 
kind of an instruction. 
"Under the circumstances there is nothing for 
us to do but affirm the judgment of the lower court." 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion went on to say: 
"* * * Counsel, as an officer of the court, has 
the duty as a specialist on the case, which he should 
be, to point out a failure by the court to instruct on 
a salient material proposition of law. He is a back-
stop in that regard. If he does not do so his client 
cannot afterward complain that the instructions 
were insufficient or incomplete. 
"However, I have a doubt as to whether the 
provisions of Sec. 105-32-18, U. C. A. 1943, should 
be brought to the attention of the jury. It certainly 
is for the court to say, in the first instance, whether 
there is corroborating evidence. If there is, the 
court will overrule a motion for nonsuit, or for a 
directed verdict. But whether after that the court 
should instruct the jury, and thus place on it the 
sometimes difficult task of differentiating corrobo-
rating testimony from other testimony, presents to 
me a serious question. * * * I need only signify 
my doubt as to the other point in order that it will 
not be assumed that it escaped notice and, more im-
portant, that it will not be hereafter argued that by 
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implication this court held that an instruction as to 
the necessity for corroborating evidence was neces-
sary." (Emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict and the sentence of the court below should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
. E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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